FOREWORD
The Infantry Forces Research Unit of the U.S. Anny Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducts research that contributes to a better understanding of soldier-based instructional issues under its Training Modernization for Infantry Forces research program. In support of this objective, our scientists have participated in 14 field experiments conducted under the auspices of the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. The last of these field experimente formed the basis of this report. It investigated the degree to which squad radios contribute to the battlefield situation awareness (SA) of squad leaders and squad members.
Prior to this field experiment, we developed a pair of new instruments for me^uring the SA of small unit leaders based on information that could be gleaned from the unobtrusive realtime monitoring of platoon and squad radio networks. From an initial pool of 318 critical incidents of communication behavior, 60 were culled on the basis of high independent evaluator agreement to form the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale. This report documents the methodological development of these new SA measures and presents the results of a limited field evaluation involving seven squad leaders for six trials each.
Although the size of our squad leader sample prevents one fi-om drawing any definitive conclusions about the RCCOLA and FELLA instruments, results were promising and generally positive. Both instruments demonstrated high levels of interrater agreement and both can be said to possess a certain measure of content-related validity, based on the way the instruments were constructed. We recommend their fiiture use, for both training and continued research, in all situations where small unit radio networks can be monitored by qualified pereonnel. These results have been presented to key research sponsors in the MOUT ACTD and Objective Force Warrior (OFW) programs during March of 2003. We hope to interest you to learn more about the potential SA benefits of improved soldier communication at the small unit level.
KATHLEEN A. QUINKERT Acting Technical Director

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION-BASED MEASURES OF SITUATION AWARENESS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Research Requirement:
It is generally accepted that the most precise way of gauging situation awareness (SA) is to use objective me^ures, where important aspects of the situations investigated can be accurately known to boA research participants and experimenters. Unfortunately, objective measures are relatively obtrusive and difficult to administer. They also lack robustness across situations, as a new test must be developed for each experimental scenario. The present investigation sought to develop and field test two new behavioral me^ures of SA that were based on tiie content of small unit radio transmissions monitored by unobtrusive observers.
Procedure:
A team of four retired military personnel was given a two-hour training workshop on how to write critical incidents of communication behavior. Over the couree of the next several weeks, the team generated a pool of 318 incidents of communication behavior, each intended to represent either an outstanding, typical, or poor level of SA on the part of squad and platoon leadere. This item pool was then given to a group of 24 independent evaluators. Each evaluator was ^ked to judge whether or not each item reflected the SA of small unit leadere. If they judged an item as being related to the concept of SA, they were also asked to indicate whether Ihe item suggested an outstanding, typical, or poor level of SA. For each of the three levels of SA, the 20 items with the highest levels of agreement among the independent evaluators were formed into two communication-based SA measures. These were termed the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale. Although both measures were based on the same 60 items, they differed greatly in their format. The RCCOLA checklist was used to record how fi-equently a specific set of behaviore occurred during the course of a mission, while the FELLA questionnaire was completed at the end of a mission and asked raters to predict or estimate the likelihood these behaviors would occur in fiiture missions along a seven-point Likert scale.
Six field trials were then conducted with each of seven squad leadere and their respective squads. All trials for a given squad consisted of variations of a reconnaissance/link-up mission and were completed within a 12-hour time period. Three squad radio conditions were used, with one day and one night trial conducted for each condition. The conditions were no squad radio, squad radio with only the squad leader transmitting, and squad radio with both the squad leader and squad membera having the fi-eedom to transmit. Based on their monitoring of squad and platoon radios, two independent ratere completed a separate RCCOLA checklist during each of the 42 total trials, m well as a separate FELLA scale after the completion of each trial.
vu Findings:
B^ed on the percentage of nearly identical item scores (+/-1), interrater agreement was found to be generally high for both the RCCOLA checklist (97.5%) and the FELLA scale (84.4%) across trials. Because they were constructed from items having a high level of agreement among independent evaluators, we can also assume both measures possess a certain amount of content-related validity. Though it did not approach statistical significance, a small consistent trend among the squad radio conditions and our communication-based measures was found. In particular, the highest average SA scores were obtained during trials when squad members were allowed to transmit freely, perhaps because there were a significantly greater number of audible squad radio transmissions during these trials (p < .001).
Utilization of Findings:
We recommend the use of RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale in fiiture research, field exercises, and virtual training environments where radio transmissions of small unit personnel can be monitored. Additional research is needed to increase the sample of small imit leadere, to determine the relationship of communication-based measures to more objective measures of SA, and to gauge their utility for a wider variety of soldier missions.
As squad and platoon radios are beginning to proliferate within small units, the ability of our soldiers to communicate effectively with each other will become a critical factor influencing their ultimate level of combat effectiveness. How squad members contribute, or fail to contribute, to the SA of their squad and platoon leaders is an after-action review topic that needs more emphasis. Similarly, we also need to understand and emphasize how the communication behaviors of small unit leaders contribute or detract from the situational understanding of their subordinates. Before the promise of better small unit commimication can be realized, however, we must get trainers and observer/controllers to routinely monitor squad and platoon radios during field exercises and training center rotations. Once optimal squad and platoon radio communication procedures have been identified, they need to be formally infroduced into appropriate institutional courees for the benefit of junior leadere. We believe that communication-based measures of SA, such as those explored in the present report, can serve an important role in improving the communication practices and resulting levels of situational understandmg among all soldiere at the small unit level. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION-BASED MEASURES
Introduction
The present research effort is a largely serendipitous product of two ongoing lines of investigation, specifically research related to the measurement and training of situation awareness (SA) in Infantry leaders and research aimed at discovering the most effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to use with squad and platoon radio networks. In the first case, identifying SA requirements and their relationships with emerging technology was the focus of early thought in the area of Infantry SA (Graham & Matthews, 1999) . Building upon the earlier theoretical work of Endsley (1995b) , an Infantry-focused model of mdividual SA was developed (Endsley et al, 2000) . As a prelude to developing an Infantry SA trainer, the highestpriority S A training requirements were also identified. These requirements were schema training, task management and prioritization, communications training, and contingency planning (Strater, Jones, & Endsley, 2001) .
It is generally accepted that the most precise way of gauging SA is to use objective measures, where various aspects of the situations investigated can be accurately known to both research participants and experimentere (Endsley, 1995a; Redden & Blackwell, 2001) , There the focus of measurement is on the degree to which individual perceptions of situational characteristics differ from what is known to be "ground" truth. Though their reliability and validity are usually more than adequate, objective measures are relatively obtrusive and difficult to administer. They also lack robustness across situations (i.e., a new test must be developed for each experimental scenario). Together with the present investigation, some recent research efforts have explored the use of more subjective alternatives to traditional methods of measuring SA objectively (Matthews, Beal, & Pleban, 2002; Strater, Endsley, Pleban, & Matthews, 2001 ).
In the second case, while attempting to categorize and quantify radio transmissions in previous investigations of the relationship between various small-unit radio TTPs and SA (Christ & Evam, 2001; Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab & Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 1999; Redden & Blackwell, 2001) , observers noticed that some squad leadere appeared to have greater SA than others, based solely on the nature and content of their radio communication with superiors, peers, and subordinates. The present research effort is an attempt to quantify this earlier behavioral observation. We seek to eventually develop communication-b^ed me^ures of SA that will reliably diflferentiate the performance of small unit leadere and will closely mirror the psychometric properties of more objective SA measures.
The present report is organized around two separate, though interrelated, research efforts. First, we document the methodological development of two communication-based SA measures from a common pool of over 300 behavioral incidents. These measures are a behavioral checklist called the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and a questionnaire called Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA). Second, we present the results of a limited number of field trials of these measures that were conducted with Infantry squad leadere and their squads. In the last section of the report we discuss future potential uses of the two scales.
Development of Situation Awareness Measures
Our approach to developing communication-based SA measures involved the use of the critical incident technique, originally described by Flanagan (1954) . Four retired military personnel were given a two-hour training workshop on how to write suitable incidents of communication behavior. This training stressed four characteristics of critical incidente: their behavioral nature, specificity, ability to differentiate among people, and clarity. Examples of both acceptable and unacceptable incidents were provided. The firet few incidents written by each participant were critiqued and suggestions for improvement were offered. Over a subsequent period of several weeks, participants generated a pool of 318 behavioral incidents on their own, each intended to represent either outstanding, typical, or poor SA on the part of platoon or squad leaders. In addition to using their own experience, the four item authors consulted a variety of publications to stimulate thought about item content and to widen the conceptual coverage of the item pool. These publications included doctrinal manuals (Department of the Army, 1992 Army, ,1994 , the results of a recent SA requirements analysis (Strater et al., 2001) , various bulletins and reporte of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, m well as Combat Trainmg Center compendia.
After editing to create a common style, the 318 behavioral incidents were given to a group of 24 independent evaluators. Each evaluator was asked to judge whether or not each item reflected the SA of small unit leadere. If they judged an item as bemg related to the concept of S A, they were also asked to indicate whether the item suggested outstanding, typical, or poor SA. The questionnaire used in the indqjendent evaluation is shown in Appendix A. The group of independent evaluators included active duty military pereonnel (n -9), retired military personnel (n -7), and civilian scientists familiar with military field research (M = 8). Table 1 shows the level of agreement on item content between the item authors and the independent evaluators. Generally, items written to reflect poor or typical levels of leader SA were viewed as such by a majority of the independent evaluators. However, items written to reflect outstanding SA were, more often than not, seen as reflecting a typical level of SA. This effect was strongest among the active duty military evaluatore. After the results of the independent evaluation were tobulated, the 318 items were sorted according to their level of evaluator agreement, from highest to lowest. There were 28 items that fewer than 20 independent evaluators thought reflected some level of SA, These were eliminated from any fiirther consideration. An additional 108 items were eliminated because the majority of evaluatore disagreed with the intent of the item authors. For example, 17 of the evaluators thought item 40 represented an outstanding level of leader SA, while six thought it represented a typical level of SA, and one was not convinced it represented SA at all. This item was dropped because the authors had intended it to reflect a typical level of SA. For each SA level, the 20 items having the greatest independent evaluator agreement were selected for inclusion in the RCCOLA and FELLA scales. Agreement statistics for the 60 chosen items are shown in Table 2 . 
Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness
As shown in Appendix B, the 60 items selected as a result of the independent evaluation were formed into a behavioral checMist titled the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA). This SA measure was designed to enable observers to record the occurrence of SA-related commimication behaviors in real time while listening to the squad and platoon radio networks of a squad leader. Similarly, RCCOLA items were designed to be suitable for the assessment of platoon leader SA, by listening to company and platoon radio networks. Every time a particular behavior was heard, observers or raters would place a checkmark next to that item on the checklist. Thus, it was possible for each RCCOLA item to receive multiple checkmarks, one for each occurrence of a particular behavior.
Items representmg outstanding, typical, and poor SA were segregated and then grouped into four temporal categories: planning/preparing, movement, actions on enemy contact, and miscellaneous. These categories were chosen to hasten the ratings process under real-time conditions, making it easier for observers to locate particular items as a mission unfolds. The categories were not thought to be underlying factore of an SA construct. The miscellaneous category included items that could occur at any time during a mission. For each trial or mission, the RCCOLA measure is scored as follows:
number of outstanding checkmarks -number of poor checkmarks total number of outstanding, typical, and poor checkmarks Possible RCCOLA scores can range from -1 to +1, with a score of 0 indicating a typical level of SA for squad leadere.
Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness
The same 60 items selected from the independent evaluation were also formed into what we called the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale (see Appendix C), Unlike the RCCOLA measure, the FELLA scale was designed to be completed at the end of an experimental trial or operational mission. Further, the FELLA items were hsted in random order, without grouping them into categories. The FELLA scale was designed to be more fiiture oriented and subjective than the RCCOLA measure, asking raters their expectations of the likelihood of particular leader behaviore occurring in subsequent missions.
The 60 FELLA items were scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from "Highly Unlikely" (1) to "Highly Likely" (7), with the scale's midpoint being "Hard to Say" (4). The 20 items representmg a poor level of leader SA were reveree scored. An overall FELLA scale score was obtained by calculating the mean of the 60 items. Thus, possible overall scores could range from 1 to 7,
Global SA Assessment Item
Finally, a global assessment item was added to the end of the FELLA scale. This item asked ratere about their overall expectations of a leader's SA level m future missions. The global assessment item was scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from "Poor" (1) to "Outstanding" (7), with "Center of Mass" being the midpoint anchor. If a large enough leader sample could be obtained in future experimentation, this item could help to determme the relative contribution of particular leader behaviors to the overall concept of SA.
Evaluation of Situation Awareness Measures
Field trials using the RCCOLA checklist and the FELLA scale were conducted as part of a larger field experiment investigating the degree to which squad radios enhanced soldier SA. Sponsored by the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOOT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonsfration (ACTD) program, this experiment was a direct follow-on effort to an earlier experiment whose results have aheady been reported in detail (Christ & Evans, 2002; Redden & Blackwell, 2001 ). The earlier experiment involved the use of experienced squads conducting offensive and defensive missions in an urban environment, where squad members maintained direct visual contact with each other much of the time, hi contrast, the present experiment involved the use of relatively inexperienced squads conducting reconnaissance and link-up missions in a largely wooded environment, where the squad's two teams were geographically separated from each other most of the time. Each team approached a fenced compoimd from different directions, where they were instructed to surreptitiously report any activities of observed enemy and civilian personnel. Later, the teams linked up at a designated checkpoint, which served as another site for the observation and reporting of enemy and civilian activities.
Research Participants
Research participants were seven squad leadere, each having two teams of either three or four men each. Most of these squad leaders were relatively inexperienced, either having been recently assigned to the squad or having been assigned to a temporary squad leadership position, hi some cases, squad leadere had no prior field training experience with their squads. Our research focused only on the SA of the squad leaders, as reflected in their radio communications with squad members and with a simulated platoon leader. The platoon leader's role w^ played by an experimenter whose outgoing radio transmissions were largely dictated by a rehearaed mission script for each trial.
Measures and Raters
A team of two retired Infantry officeiB served as independent ratere, each completing a separate RCCOLA checkUst during each trial, as well as a separate FELLA scale and global ^sessment item immediately after the completion of each trial. One member of the rating team participated m ratmg all seven squad leaders. The second member of the ratmg team rated only the first three squad leadere. A third retired Infantry officer served as the second rater for the last four squad leadere. Finally, a civilian member of the research staff separately logged the number and types of radio transmissions heard over the squad and platoon radio networks using a realtune categorization scheme described by Christ and Evans (2002) . Specifically, each squad and platoon radio transmission was logged into one of 15 mutually exclusive categories: Provide Acknowledgment, Provide Direction, Provide hiformation (Friendly), Provide Information (Threat), Provide Opinion, Request Acknowledgment, Request Direction, Request Information (Friendly), Request hiformation (Threat), Request Opinion, Unrelated to Mission, Administrative/Other, Inaudible, Break Squelch, or Hot Microphone.
Procedure
Each of the seven squad leadere completed six trials. Consequently, each SA measure was used during each of the 42 separate trials. The average duration of each trial was 41 minutes, with the reconnaissance portion requiring an average of 20 minutes and the link-up portion requiring an average of 21 minutes. Each squad leader's firet three trials were conducted during daylight hours and their last three trials were conducted at night. All trials for an mdividual squad leader were completed over a 12-hour period. For scheduling reasons, the order of day and night trials was not counterbalanced across squad leadere, so visibility level was not a factor analyzed in this experiment.
There were three squad radio conditions evaluated m the experiment, with each day and night trial having a different squad radio condition. One day trial and one night trial for each squad leader was conducted without squad radios. In this baseline condition, the squad leader used a radio only to communicate with the platoon leader. On all other trials, the squad leader had two radios, one to communicate with his squad members and the other to conamunicate with the platoon leader, to the second squad radio condition, only the squad leader could initiate transmissions over the squad radio. Squad members could listen and acknowledge the receipt of a squad leader transmission, but could not mitiate transmissions themselves, to the third squad radio condition, squad membere were free to initiate transmissions at any time, either to their squad leader or to other squad members. The order of these squad radio conditions was largely counterbalanced across trials. Three different Opposing Force (OPFOR) scripts and two different lanes of movement were used alternately across trials, insuring that each squad leader encountered a novel set of circumstances on each of his six trials.
Results
Ehie to the relatively small sample of squad leaders (n = 1) and the variability in their performance across trials, our analyses were based principally on the use of descriptive statistics. As shown in Table 3 , the performance of the squad leaders, averaged across raters and trials, tended to fall withm the middle and lower ranges of our three SA measures. The percentage of interrater agreement on our three measures was found to be generally high, as shown m Table 4 . A plot of RCCOLA total scores for the two raters across 42 trials is shown in Figure 1 . The integere shown in the body of Figure 1 are squad leader numbere. Each squad leader is shown six times, once for each trial. Some squad leaders demonstrated a fairly consistent level of performance across trials (e.g.. Squad Leader 5), wWle others were highly inconsistent (e.g.. Squad Leader 1). Although we had no expectation that all RCCOLA items could be observed during the course of every conceivable type of mission, we found that 23 of the 60 items (38%) were never observed by either rater during our field trials. These unobserved items included 12 of the 20 outstanding SA items (60%), 2 of the 20 typical SA items (10%), and 9 of the 20 poor SA items (45%). Most of these unobserved items can be attributed to the nature of the reconnaissance and link-up mission scenarios used in the present experiment. Because squads were expected to observe the enemy without being detected and to refrain from engaging them with weapons.
RCCOLA items involving ammunition resupply, fire control, and casualty evacuation behaviors were unlikely to occur. However, there were also a few RCCOLA items that could conceivably have occurred, but were just never observed among the squad leaders in our sample (e.g., "treats a sound recommendation or advice from subordinates as an interruption and takes no action"). The frequency with which each RCCOLA item was observed is shown in Appendix D.
During the course of data collection, raters noticed it was harder to form an opinion about a squad leader's level of SA on baseline trials, when no squad radio was used. This anecdotal finding was supported by a comparison of the average number of items receiving a rating of four on the FELLA scale across the experimental radio conditions. When no squad radio was used, 45 of the 60 items were rated as "hard to say" by the two raters on average. When a squad radio was used, with squad members listenmg but not fransmitting, the average number of items rated as "hard to say" fell to 21. That number was reduced even ftirther, to 18, when squad members were allowed to freely transmit. These overall differences across conditions were foimd to be statistically significant, F(2,12) = 42.41,/> < .0001. Pairwise comparisons using the Least Significant Difference Test indicated that both squad radio conditions were significantly different from the no squad radio condition ip < .001), though the two squad radio conditiom were not significantly different from each another.
Though it did not approach statistical significance, there WM a small consistent trend among the squad radio conditions and our three commimication-based SA measures (see Table  5 ). For each me^ure, the highest SA scores were obtained during trials when a squad radio was used, particularly when squad membere were allowed to transmit freely. In addition, significantly greater numbers of audible squad radio transmissions occurred during these trials, F(l,6) = 22.24,p<.001. Note. RCCOLA = Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness. FELLA = Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness. There were 14 trials for each squad radio condition, one day trial and one night trial for each squad leader.
Discussion
Although the size of our squad leader sample limits the conclusions one can draw from the field trials, the findings obtained were largely positive. Our communication-based measures of SA appear to have a sufficient level of interrater agreement. Additionally, they possess a certain measure of content-related validity b^ed on the way they were constructed (i.e., SMEs had to agree that items reflected leader SA in order to be included on the RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale). The measures also appear sensitive to differences in the way squad radios were used (e.g., whether or not squad members were allowed to transmit). For these reasons, we recommend the use of the RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale in future research, field exercises, and virtual training environments where radio transmissions of small unit personnel can be monitored. Further research is needed to incre^e the sample of small imit leaders, to determine the relationship of communication-based measures to more objective measures of SA, and to gauge their utility for a wider variety of soldier missions.
Raters had more difficulty using the FELLA scale than they did the RCCOLA checklist. The FELLA scale required a greater number of discrete decisions to be made and it required the rater to estimate or predict the likelihood of fiiture events based on events in the recent past. These decisions and estimates had to be made within a time limit of approximately 15 minutes, indirectly imposed by the pace with which experimental trials were run. In contrast, the RCCOLA checklist only required the rater to note how often specific behaviors occurred during the course of a mission. The FELLA scale was also more difficult to use because the wording of several of its items was found to be confusing (e.g., was it highly unlikely "this SL could be expected not to report being in a danger area or could be expected to take no action to avoid it?"). Future use of the FELLA scale should consider small wording changes to help clarify the intended meaning of these problematic items, even if the integrity of the original wording has to be compromised. While the FELLA scale w^ intended to be more of a research tool, for use in item analysis and factor analytic studies of the instrument's imderlying content and structure, the FELLA scale could also be used in situations where raters cannot rely on real-time methods of leader evaluation.
Based on informal conversations held with squad leaders before their firat trial, we knew our sample w^ not representative of Infantry squad leadere overall. In particular, our sample was notably inexperienced. As a result, the performance of many squad leadeis w^ erratic over trials and the upper levels of the communication-based SA measures were rarely used. Future research with these measures should seek to broaden the squad leader sample in terms of their experience, as well as extend the sample to platoon leaders, a group for which most of our behavioral items should still apply. It should also be noted that the methods used to create the SA instruments described in the present report could be e^ily applied to other occupations where pereonnel routinely communicate via radio (e.g., police, fire, and paramedic organizations).
As squad and platoon radios become more common items of equipment within small units, the ability of our soldiers to commimicate effectively with each other will become a critical factor influencing their ultimate level of combat effectiveness. In the past, when most small unit pereonnel did not communicate with radios, this was an issue rarely addressed in after-action reviews (AARs) of unit performance. This situation needs to change in a hurry. How squad membere contribute, or fail to contribute, to the SA of their squad and platoon leadere is an AAR topic that needs more emphasis. Similarly, we also need to underetand and emphasize how the communication behaviors of small unit leadere contribute or detract from the situational imderetanding of their subordinates. Before the promise of better small unit communication can be realized, however, we must get trainers and observer/controllers to routinely monitor squad and platoon radios during field exercises and training center rotations. Once optimal squad and platoon radio communication procedures have been identified, they need to be formally introduced into appropriate institutional courees for the benefit of junior leadere. We believe that communication-based measures of SA, such as those explored in die present report, can serve an important role in improving the communication practices and resulting levels of situational underetanding among all soldiers at the small unit level. Rater PLANNING / PREPARING OUTSTANDING requests additional time or assets when an unrealistic task is assigned. anticipates noncombatant actions within liis area and directs elements to be prepared to respond.
TYPICAL directs subordinates to conduct communication checks before mission begins. conveys an accurate picture of the situation after answering some questions from subordinates. provides warning to subordinate leaders of a change in mission upon notification from higher headquarters. directs a "be prepared" order to subordinates, after receiving planning directions from higher.
POOR
fails to disseminate or Inadequately disseminates critical change-of-mlssion infomnation or factors Impacting current mission to subordinates. fails to anticipate the need for night observation devices and begins night operations without them. does not notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals that are being used during an operation. does not issue "be prepared" orders after receiving guidance from higher to do so. does not convey an accurate picture of the situation even after answering questions. does not convey a complete picture of the situation even after answering questions. does not convey the commander's intent to subordinates during a change of mission order. presents a plan that will not accomplish the task in the time required.
MOVEMENT OUTSTANDING
anticipates activity and locates himself at the best position to control unit. reports encountering mines or obstacles along unit route of movement and presents the operational impact or possible COAs to overcome the Impediment. TYPICAL occasionally must ask subordinates to report their current positions. directs a change in unit movement fonnation because ten-ain just encountered has changed, recognizes that his unit has moved into a danger area, he reports this, and then takes action to move through or out of the danger area. reports encountering mines or obstacles along his unit route of movement. modifies plan or activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit, after receiving directions to do so from a higher. ^ POOR does not report that his unit is at a danger area or takes no action to avoid It. displays little knowledge of the enemy capabilities or terrain, failing to inform subordinate of enemy activities in an area capable of observing or bringing direct fire on unit positions or activities.
B-2
ACTIONS ON ENEMY CONTACT OUTSTANDING ~ when asked for a SITREP while actively engaged with the enemy, can Immediately respond with accurate infomiation. correctly identifies weakest enemy point. directs the relocation of a subordinate element to be prepared to assist/reinforce an expected weakness by another friendly element. requests assets to augment unit to assist with mission accomplishment before unit strength becomes inadequate to accomplish mission, displays evidence of fire control measures and a change In threat or danger to the unit by recommending the lifting or shifting of supporting fires in an adjacent sector. plans personnel rotation to have best people at appropriate locations to complete critical tasks. directs subordinates to break enemy contact because cost of fighting the enemy is higher than the benefit. displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by relieving or replacing a unit or element before it has become Ineffective. directs subordinate to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action. requests ammunition resupply, projecting that current supplies will be exhausted in 30 minutes given the present rate of expenditure, infomiis higher that the unit is nearing a status of non-combat effective eariy enough so higher can react. presents the future likelihood of threat COAs In providing SITREPs to the higher element while actively engaged with the enemy. TYPICAL reports enemy activity In his area to the higher element. moves forces to respond to an enemy attack or counterattack. directs a soldier to take charge of an element when he Is Informed that the element leader Is a casualty. directs subordinates to continue actions because the mission is not yet fully accomplished or complete. displays evidence of his knowledge about enemy capabilities and terrain by informing subordinate units of nearby enemy activities. POOR fails to designate a new element leader when one of them becomes a casualty. fails to direct the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty. directs that no subordinates relocate even when a subordinate element notifies him that assistance or reinforcement Is needed to accomplish the mission. directs subordinates to halt actions before the mission is accomplished/complete even though sufficient resources are available to continue the mission. continues the operation "to the last man" and does not infomi higher.
MISCELLANEOUS OUTSTANDING
whenever asked, the leader can Immediately provide a detailed and accurate platoon ACE report. modifies his current plan/activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit. conveys a complete picture of the current situation to his subordinates. takes action that Is beneficial to civilian population without hindering operations. TYPICAL requests medical evacuation for an Injured soldier. reacts to noncombatant actions In the area. uses an alternate frequency when primary frequency fails to make contact wwth intended station. reports a change of command post location. notifies appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals being used during an operation. directs a change In MOPP based on commander's guidance, orders, or the SOP, POOR does not notify subordinates of a friendly ground unit moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide. does not warn subordinates of civilian movement in the area. treats a sound recommendation or advice from subordinates as an intenruptlon and takes no action. does not notify subordinates of a friendly aircraft moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide. falls to direct any reallocatlon of critical resources
